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After clerking at the Arkansas Court of Appeals for more than a
year now, I can say with confidence that law schools are teaching Ar-
kansas lawyers the substantive law they need to write good appellate
briefs. Often, however, these lawyers make good substantive argu-
ments that fail only because of misunderstandings about, or neglect of,
appellate court practices. Judges are often forced, by rule or conven-
tion, to decide against a litigant simply because of their lawyer's er-
rors. The Academy of Appellate Lawyers has recognized this problem
in other states as well, reporting that
too many appellate briefs reflect ignorance of critical elements of
the appellate process .... Lawyers who do not understand these
concepts ... present cases with too many issues, the wrong issues,
or no legitimate issues at all. These briefs ... show little or no un-
derstanding of how appellate judges analyze cases and make deci-
sions.1
Why do so many lawyers with worthy arguments lack the vital
knowledge about appellate practice that will allow judges to rule in
their favor, and what are we to do about this problem? Should we of-
fer more appellate-practice CLEs or create different bar admissions
standards for appellate lawyers?2 Perhaps. But another solution might
be to carefully integrate more teaching of basic appellate practices
into substantive law school classes. After all, legal writing professors
often incorporate substantive law in their curricula to teach brief-
writing and appellate advocacy. Why, then, could not professors in
* 2006 UALR Bowen School of Law graduate. Employed as a judicial clerk
from January 2007 until December 2008 for Judges D.P. Marshall and Sarah J. Heff-
ley. Many thanks to all who advised and contributed to this article, including D. Price
Marshall, Associate Judge of the Arkansas Court of Appeals; Kathryn Hall Henry;
and Professors Frances S. Fendler, Lynn C. Foster, Thomas S. Sullivan, and Coleen
M. Barger, all of the UALR Bowen School of Law.
1. Statement on the Functions and Future of Appellate Lawyers, 8 J. App. PRAC.
& PROCESS 1, 11 (2006) [hereinafter JAPPI.
2. JAPP supra note 1, at 12-15 (suggesting improvements for future appellate
practice).
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doctrinal courses weave strands of appellate practice into their curri-
cula?
Some may question the need for this integration when entire law
school classes are already devoted to procedure-both civil and crimi-
nal-and many legal writing classes address appellate practice. These
questions are justified in the interest of efficient uses of time and re-
sources. But perhaps integrating more appellate practice instruction
into substantive classes will allow students to keep the relationship
between the two concepts fresher in their minds. Substance and appel-
late procedure, which affect one another and are part of one body of
law, would then be less separated conceptually in students' minds.
Maybe then appellate briefs would reflect the substantive learning of
lawyers.
But why, some would ask, spend time on appellate practice at all?
Don't only a handful of lawyers actually practice appellate law as a
specialty? Not really. All trial lawyers should try their cases with an
eye toward a potential appeal. After all, half of the litigants who go to
trial will lose. If the trial lawyer fails to lay a good foundation for a
potential appeal, the client will lose in the appellate court too. Fur-
thermore, "[ain ethical, well-informed appellate lawyer is the first line
of defense against irrationality, waste, and pettiness in the appellate
process."3
II. FOUR CRITICAL MISTAKES IN CURRENT APPELLATE PRACTICE
In my time at the Arkansas Court of Appeals, I have observed
lawyers making a few critical mistakes in their appellate practice.
These mistakes probably occur in other state courts as well. The
broader suggestions of this article, therefore, may also work beyond
Arkansas despite interstate differences in appellate standards and
procedures. Sections A, B, C, and D of this article will examine in de-
tail these four critical failings in current practice and make suggestions
for addressing them in substantive law courses.
First, many appellants' lawyers do not seem to understand that
only some orders may be appealed. If the lower court's order is not
final, or among the types of non-final orders that can be appealed,
then the appellate court will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
regardless of its merits. Second, appellants often lose their appeals
because the issues about which they argue (even when they argue per-
suasively) have not been preserved in the lower court for appellate
3. JAPP supra note 1, at 4.
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review. Third, many appellants are unsuccessful because they frame
their arguments without reference to the appropriate standard of re-
view. This standard is the lens through which the appellate judges eva-
luate the lower court's order and is often outcome-determinative. Fi-
nally, the pressure of clients' expectations and filing deadlines often
leads lawyers to become careless when preparing their briefs-careless
in their adherence to court rules, in writing style and tone, and in the
brief's overall presentation.
Each of these mistakes is avoidable. Before filing a notice of ap-
peal to an appellate court, lawyers should ask themselves two ques-
tions: Do I have an appealable order? If so, has the issue I have iden-
tified for appeal been preserved for review? If the answers are yes,
lawyers should further ask themselves: What is the appellate court's
standard of review, and have I framed my argument in those terms?
And if so, have I followed the appellate rules and composed a good,
careful brief? Only after asking and answering affirmatively all these
questions should the lawyer file the brief.
These problems in appellate brief writing can, and should, be ad-
dressed in substantive law school classes. Some of the mistakes, such
as arguing from an inappropriate standard of review, must be ad-
dressed differently depending on the particular substance of the class.
Others, such as failing to preserve issues for appeal or careless brief-
writing, can be addressed similarly in almost every class. Below are
more thorough discussions of these problems and some suggestions
for correcting them in substantive law school courses. Creative and
dynamic law school professors can use these suggestions as starting
points to expand their teaching techniques to include aspects of appel-
late practice.
A. Do I Have an Appealable Order?
1. Understanding the Appealability Rule
An appellate lawyer's first task is to identify the correct order
from which to appeal. Finding an appealable order is crucial because
the appellate court must consider the issue of appealability sua sponte
to determine whether it has jurisdiction even if the parties themselves
do not raise the issue.' Some interlocutory orders are appealable. For
example, if the court enters an order that, in effect, determines the
action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal may be taken,
4. Roberts v. Roberts, 70 Ark. App. 94, 95, 14 S.W.3d 529, 530 (2000).
2008]
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the party against whom the order was entered may immediately ap-
peal.' Similarly, orders that grant or refuse new trials, strike answers
or pleadings, disqualify attorneys from participation in the case, grant
or deny class certifications, and grant, continue, modify, refuse, or dis-
solve an injunction are immediately appealable.6 Appellants' lawyers
must be able to quickly recognize those orders and act before the time
to appeal has expired.
Usually, however, a losing party may appeal only from a final or-
der or judgment! That order must dispose of all of the parties and
claims in the case before the lower court-otherwise it is not appeala-
ble.8 For example, in Roberts, a divorce case, the court dismissed the
appeal because the parties had agreed, before the appeal, that further
decisions were required before the court could distribute their marital
property; thus, the divorce decree was not final.' Moreover, the appel-
lant must specifically identify that order and the appealing parties in
the notice of appeal,1' otherwise the case will be dismissed." Adhering
to the appealable-order rule avoids piecemeal litigation and promotes
efficiency, 2 helping the courts save time and resources.
Generally, it is relatively easy to find the order from which a par-
ty must appeal. But some cases require more careful attention to the
exact terms of the lower court's judgment. Civil appeals must arise
from a lower court order that settles all the parties' issues and "put[s]
the trial court's directive into execution, ending the litigation, or a se-
parable branch of it."' 3 Thus, the order must dismiss all of the parties
from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their
rights to the subject matter in controversy. 4 If it does not do so, then
the case may be dismissed on finality grounds. Such was the case in
5. ARK. R. APP. P. - Civ. 2(a).
6. Id.
7. One "exception" to the finality rule involves cases in which the circuit court
may, in its discretion, issue a certificate under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
explaining to the appellate court why an immediate appeal of a final judgment affect-
ing only some of the claims or parties is warranted. See John J. Watkins, "The Myste-
ries of Rule 54(b)," at ARK. L. NoTEs 117 (1996).
8. Roberts, 70 Ark. App. at 95-96, 14 S.W.3d at 530-31.
9. Id. at 96, 14 S.W.3d at 531.
10. Ark. R. App. P. - Civ. 3(e); Ark. R. App. P. - Crim. 2(a)(4).
11. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Rogers v. Deason, 300 Ark. 30, 31, 775 S.W.2d
909, 910 (1989) (stating, in dicta, that the attempted notice of appeal was ineffective
because it failed to mention the order appealed from and omitted a party's name).
12. Id.
13. Roberts, 70 Ark. App. at 95.
14. Id.
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Downing v. Lawrence Hall Nursing Center,15 where the administrator
of an estate had filed a wrongful-death action against a nursing home,
hospital, and several other unidentified "John Doe" defendants.16 The
circuit court dismissed the action against the nursing home and hospit-
al on the ground that Downing did not have standing to bring the ac-
tion; the court did not, however, address the John Does in its dismissal
order." Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the case on its merits for lack of an appealable order."i
Similarly, from a practical standpoint, if a court's decision does
not conclude the merits of the case, then the appeal is premature and
will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.' 9 In Doe v. Union Pacific
Railroad, for example, the court dismissed the appeal because the
lower court's ruling did not end the litigation. ° The appellant argued
that the court's order on her Motion for Leave to File Under Seal-to
preserve her anonymity-was final because disclosure of her identity
would divest her of a substantial right and the Arkansas Supreme
Court would then be unable to place her in her former condition.2
The supreme court disagreed, ruling that nothing indicated that the
appellant could not or would not prosecute her case without anonymi-
ty. 2 She only showed was that it would be emotionally difficult for her
to pursue her lawsuit in her own name.23 Because there was no evi-
dence that burdensome and meaningless litigation would result with-
out an immediate appeal, the appeal was premature, and the court
dismissed it without prejudice.24
Criminal cases generally follow the same rule. A defendant may
appeal from a conviction within thirty days of the entry of the judg-
ment and commitment order or from an order denying certain post-
trial motions.' Guilty pleas and pleas of no contest usually may not be
appealed.26 The exceptions to that general rule, however, should make
criminal appellate lawyers cautious as they decide whether to enter a
15. 368 Ark. 51, 243 S.W.3d 263 (2006).
16. Id. at 52, 243, S.W.3d at 264.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 53-54, 243 S.W.3d at 265-66.
19. Doe v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 323 Ark. 237,240, 914 S.W.2d 312, 314 (1996).
20. Id. at 242, 914 S.W.2d at 315.
21. Id. at 239, 914 S.W.2d at 312.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 242, 914 S.W.2d at 315.
25. Ark. R. App. P. - Crim. 1 and 4(a).
26. ARK. R. APP. P. - CRIM. 1(a); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.3(b), 26.1.
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guilty plea and whether to subsequently appeal.27 Criminal appellate
lawyers should also remember to appeal from an order of conviction,
not just an adverse ruling on a motion that does not result in convic-
tion.2 Pre-trial evidentiary rulings, for example, are not appealable, as
was illustrated in Butler v. State,29 where the defendant tried to appeal
the circuit court's order that he submit to blood and saliva tests.3" The
court dismissed his appeal because that pre-trial ruling was not ap-
pealable.31
Finally, lawyers must be sure that the lower court's order contains
all the information that is required to make it appealable. In a suit to
quiet title to property, for example, the order must include a specific
description of the land; otherwise, it is not appealable.32 Similarly, the
court will dismiss an appeal about a claim to an easement if the circuit
court's order purportedly quieting title did not specifically describe
the easement's boundaries.3 Furthermore, in adverse possession cases,
the order must dispose of all of the possible claimants, not just some of
them.34 In Koonce v. Mitchell,35 the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed
and dismissed a lower-court judgment because it found that neither it
nor the lower court had jurisdiction of a quiet-title action because the
record owners were not given notice or made parties to the action be-
low. 36 If the order does not contain the elements required to appeal,
the potential appellant must take some intermediate action to obtain
an appealable order before filing the notice of appeal.
27. E.g., ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.3(b) (permitting withdrawal of a guilty plea if de-
fendant reserved the right to challenge, on appeal from a conviction, an adverse ruling
on a pretrial motion to suppress certain evidence); Green v. State, 362 Ark. 459, 209
S.W.3d 339 (2005) (reaching, on appeal, an issue that was neither a part of the ac-
cepted guilty plea nor part of sentencing terms that were an integral part of accepting
the guilty plea); Bradford v. State, 351 Ark. 394, 94 S.W.3d 904 (2003) (holding that
the defendant, who entered a guilty plea, could appeal an allegedly illegal sentence
imposed at a separate sentencing proceeding); Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d
275 (1994) (reviewing non-jurisdictional issues arising in the penalty phase of a bifur-
cated trial where the defendant entered a guilty plea).
28. Butler v. State, 311 Ark. 334, 338, 842 S.W.2d 435,438-39 (1992).
29. Id. at 338, 842 S.W.2d at 439.
30. Id. at 336, 842 S.W.2d at 437.
31. Id. at 338, 842 S.W.2d at 439.
32. Petrus v. Nature Conservancy, 330 Ark. 722, 727, 957 S.W.2d 688, 690 (1997).
33. Id.
34. Koonce v. Mitchell, 341 Ark. 716,718, 19 S.W.3d 603, 605 (2000).
35. 341 Ark. 716, 19 S.W.3d 603 (2000).
36. Id. at 716, 719, 19 S.W.3d at 603, 606.
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2. Suggestions for Substantive Courses Regarding Appealability
There are many ways to address the issue of appealability in subs-
tantive law school courses. It is important, for example, for professors
to point out the many kinds of final orders that may be entered in var-
ious cases. By making students aware of the variety of appealable or-
ders, professors will better prepare future lawyers to spot those orders
in their practice. An explanation of the appealable-order rule is par-
ticularly important for first-year students because first-year classes
tend to be more abstract and academic than other classes that high-
light litigation between parties. Therefore, it is important that students
learn early in their law-school careers what a final appealable order
from a real case will look like.
Family law classes present a good opportunity to teach students
about the appealable order rule. Circuit court judges enter a handful
of common orders in domestic relations cases-divorce decrees, cus-
tody orders, grants of guardianship, alimony and child-support awards,
terminations of parental rights, and dependency-neglect adjudica-
tions-only some of which are appealable. Knowing which of these
orders are appealable is especially important under the recently re-
vised Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9, which allows an appeal from
adjudication orders, review orders, some permanency planning or-
ders,37 terminations of parental rights, and denials of the right to ap-
pointed counsel." The new rule is referenced in Arkansas Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure-Civil 2, which lists the orders from which a litigant
may appeal. Under subsection (c)(3), in juvenile cases where an out-
of-home placement has been ordered, some orders are appealable. 9
Family law practitioners, especially those involved in juvenile cases,
should become familiar with this new class of appealable interlocutory
orders in dependency-neglect cases.
Family law classes also highlight the requests spouses commonly
make when seeking a divorce-child support, alimony, property divi-
sion-and issues that may arise during the proceedings that could pre-
vent an appealable order.'° The final decree must dispose of all the
37. Permanency planning orders are appealable if the court enters a final judg-
ment as to one or more issues or parties based on its express determination, supported
by factual findings, that there is no just reason to delay the appeal. ARK. SuP. CT. R. 6-
9.
38. ARK. Sup. Cr. R. 6-9.
39. Ark. R. App. P. - Civ. 2(c)(3).
40. See Allen v. Allen, 99 Ark. App. 292, 259 S.W.3d 480 (2007) (stating, in dicta,
that the divorce decree appealed from was not final because it did not specifically
2008]
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parties' claims and address each of the parties' requests, leaving no
obligations pending until other hearings take place. 4' For example, in
Allen v. Allen, 2 a recent divorce case, the court of appeals reversed
and remanded a divorce decree stating, in dicta, that it was not final.43
Because the decree did not specifically state the amount that the ap-
pellant had to pay the appellee, it gave rise to further litigation and the
appellate court could not rule on that issue. 4 Reminding students of
this requirement could help prevent dismissals in important family law
cases on appeal.
Professors in substantive law courses could also identify the
common procedural postures for cases in their particular legal area.
Students, especially first-year students, are often ignorant of the varie-
ty of procedural postures that may arise in actual cases. Rulings on
summary-judgment motions or post-trial motions may lead to orders
that seem somewhat different than a judgment on the merits of a civil
or criminal case. Civil procedure classes are ideal for pointing out
these types of orders. Professors in those classes could show students
copies of final orders in various types of cases and point out any ap-
pealable interlocutory orders that were entered throughout the case.
Criminal law professors may also remind students that they must ap-
peal from an order of conviction, not just an adverse ruling on a pre-
trial motion.45 Finally, it would be helpful for professors in most subs-
tantive courses to point out what information certain orders must con-
tain to be appealable. In property classes, for example, the professor
should point out what a final order in a quiet title or adverse posses-
sion suit must include to be appealed.46 Also, in adverse possession
cases, professors should remind students that the order must dispose
of all possible claimants, not just some of them.47






45. See Butler v. State, 311 Ark. 334, 338, 842 S.W.2d 435, 438-39 (1992) (dismiss-
ing appeal of pretrial order for murder defendants to submit to blood and saliva tests).
46. See Petrus v. Nature Conservancy, 330 Ark. 722, 957 S.W.2d 688 (1997) (dis-
missing claim to easement because the circuit court's order purportedly quieting title
did not specifically describe the easement's boundaries).
47. See Koonce v. Mitchell, 341 Ark. 716, 718, 19 S.W.3d 603, 605 (2000) (revers-
ing and dismissing a lower court judgment because neither that court nor the supreme
court had jurisdiction of a quiet-title action in which the record owners were not given
notice or made parties to the action).
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By teaching students about the pitfalls they will encounter as they
try to appeal, professors will help the courts-and future lawyers-
save time and resources as they serve litigants. Once students under-
stand the appealability rule, they will be better prepared as lawyers to
consider the next issue in a potential appeal-preservation.
B. Has the Issue on Appeal Been Preserved for Review?
1. Understanding Preservation
Lawyers often make the mistake of appealing an issue that is not
preserved for review. If an appellant makes a persuasive argument
that the lower court has erred in its judgment, then an appellate court
may reverse that ruling. Appellate courts, however, are not simply "do
over" opportunities for losing parties. They are more like "safety-
nets" for litigants-catching only reversible lower court errors. Be-
cause of that limited role, appellate courts will not rule on issues that
the trial court never had an opportunity to address. Thus, before they
file their notices of appeal, appellate lawyers must determine what
issues the court will rule upon and what parts of the record it will use
to make those decisions.
Unlike in some other states and in federal courts, Arkansas courts
generally do not reverse on an unpreserved issue even if there is plain
error in the record." Therefore, even extremely important issues, like
constitutional rights, must first be raised at the lower court level to be
considered on appeal. 9 The few exceptions to this rule focus primarily
on issues affecting the appellate court's subject-matter jurisdiction and
therefore, may be raised at any time during the case, including on ap-
peal, even if not raised below." If, for example, the circuit court enters
a sentence that was illegal on its face, the appellate court may modify
that sentence even if the defendant raises the issue for the first time on
appeal. 1
To properly preserve an argument for appeal, litigants must clear-
ly and specifically set forth the grounds of their objections or motions
48. Pharo v. State, 30 Ark. App. 94, 100-01,784 S.W.2d 64, 68 (1990).
49. Green v. State, 330 Ark. 458, 468, 956 S.W.2d 849, 854 (1997) (affirming a
murder conviction and attempted-murder conviction over the defendant's arguments
about jury instructions and self-defense because those arguments were not raised in
the trial court).
50. Mayes v. State, 351 Ark. 26, 29, 89 S.W.3d 926, 928 (2002).
51. Id. at 29-30,89 S.W.3d at 928-29.
2008]
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in the lower court. On appeal, the appellant cannot change the na-
ture or scope of that argument.13 For example, assume that the defen-
dant's lawyer objects to testimony as hearsay. The plaintiff's lawyer
then might argue that the testimony is an "admission" under Arkansas
Rule of Evidence 801(c)(2). Suppose the circuit court excludes the
testimony. The plaintiff's lawyer must advise the court, on the record,
of what the testimony would have been if allowed" and file an appeal
after the judgment. But if the plaintiff's lawyer argues on appeal that
the testimony should have been admitted under the Rule 803(2) "ex-
cited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule, then the appellate
court will not rule on the issue. Why? Because, even though the trial
lawyer argued and received a ruling on hearsay grounds, the argument
and ruling below had a different basis (admission exemption) than the
one on appeal (excited utterance exception). Because the lower court
never decided whether the statement fell under the excited utterance
exception, the appellate court will not second-guess its decision.
It is also crucial that the objection or motion be made at the time
the alleged error occurs in the lower court. This contemporaneous-
objection rule ensures prompt attention to an error, rather than allow-
ing it to be compounded by later events. Moreover, litigants have the
burden of obtaining a clear ruling from the lower court on their mo-
tion or objection to preserve that issue for appeal.5 6 "[Q]uestions left
unresolved are waived and may not be relied upon on appeal" even if
the party raised the issue below.57
The preservation rule serves several useful purposes. If a party
objects immediately to a ruling, then the trial court, which is in the
best position to avoid and correct error, may hear the arguments and
change its decision at that time. Changing the ruling soon after it oc-
curs, rather than waiting for an appeal, saves litigants and the judicial
system time and resources. Additionally, it would be unfair to reverse
a judgment on appeal based on arguments that the prevailing party
never had the chance to meet at trial. Finally, the preservation re-
52. E.g., Tosh v. State, 278 Ark. 377, 380-81, 646 S.W.2d 6, 8-9 (1983); Casteel v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 66 Ark. App. 220, 223-24,989 S.W.2d 547,549 (1999).
53. Fields v. State, 81 Ark. App. 351, 358, 101 S.W.3d 849, 855 (2003).
54. Advising the court in this way is known as a "proffer." See discussion infra
Part II.B.2.
55. Fields, 81 Ark. App. at 58, 101 S.W.3d at 855.
56. White v. Davis, 352 Ark. 183, 186, 99 S.W.3d 409, 412 (2003) (affirming trial
court's dismissal because the appellant failed to get a ruling on his objection to the




quirement also prevents "sandbagging" by lawyers who might take
unnecessary risks at trial knowing that, even if they lose, they can use
a reversible error to escape an adverse decision. By making it likely
that the trial court-rather than the appellate court-will determine
the case's outcome, the preservation rule encourages trial lawyers to
prepare and perform more carefully, rather than rely on an appellate
opportunity to correct their mistakes.
2. Suggestions for Substantive Courses Regarding Preservation
As with the appealable-order rule, there are many ways for law
professors to teach their students about preserving lower-court error.
They might, for example, point out to students when specific motions
and objections must be made in the cases they discuss in class. Evi-
dence classes and procedure classes are ideal for those instructions.
When teaching students about how to preserve error, it is helpful to
break trials into three periods-pre-trial, trial, and post-trial. Among
the objections and motions that must be made before trial are motions
to dismiss for insufficient service of process or lack of personal juris-
diction, motions to sever criminal offenses, motions for summary
judgment, and motions to suppress evidence in criminal trials. 8 If
these types of objections and motions are not made before the case
comes to trial, the issues are waived on appeal. 9 Another set of mo-
tions and objections must be made at trial-on the record when the
alleged error occurs-but not after. It includes objections to exhibits,
testimony, and the like.6° Finally, certain motions can only be made
within a certain period of time after the court enters its order. They
include motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motions
for a new trial, and motions to vacate or set aside a judgment.61 By
highlighting the times at which various motions and objections must
be made, professors truly help their students become better appellate
lawyers and prevent many important arguments from being aban-
doned in the lower court.62
58. E.g., ARK. R. CRIM. P. 22.1 (motion to sever offenses); ARK. R. Civ. P. 12(h)
(motions to dismiss); ARK. R. Civ. P. 56 (motion for summary judgment); ARK. R.
CRIM. P. 16.2(b) (motion to suppress evidence).
59. Id.
60. Mills v. State, 321 Ark. 621, 623-24, 906 S.W.2d 674, 675 (1995).
61. E.g., ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3(b) (post-trial motions); 37.2(c) (post-conviction
petitions for relief); ARK. R. Civ. P. 59(b) (motions for a new trial); ARK. R. Civ. P.
60(a) (motions to vacate judgment).
62. See J.T. Sullivan, Ethical and Effective Representation in Arkansas Capital
Trials, 60 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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Besides noting when particular motions and objections must be
made, professors can also help their students identify what issues are
commonly raised on appeal. Evidentiary rulings are frequently chal-
lenged on appeal. Thus, professors in all law school classes, and par-
ticularly in evidence class, have an opportunity to remind students
about raising a specific, contemporaneous, evidentiary objection and
getting a specific ruling on the record.63
Professors should also alert their students to the proffer rule. De-
nials of motions to admit evidence must be accompanied by a "prof-
fer"-a record showing-of what the evidence would be if it was ad-
mitted by the judge.' Violations of the proffer rule doom many appel-
late cases because if there is no proffer of the evidence, then the ap-
pellate court cannot rule on the trial court's refusal to admit it.' In
Tauber v. State,66 for instance, the court affirmed a DWI conviction
without even reviewing the trial court's refusal to allow a defense wit-
ness to testify because the defendant did not proffer that testimony.67
The proffer rule also applies to alleged errors in refusing to give
jury instructions. The requested jury instructions must be proffered if
the court refuses to give them.68 Lower-court decisions about jury in-
structions are often appealed, and whether the refused instruction was
proffered can determine the appellate court's decision. Similar to its
decision in Tauber,69 the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Watson v.
State7" held that the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction on a
lesser-included offense of second-degree battery was not reversible
because Watson did not make a record proffer of the instruction he
was requesting.71
Criminal law classes also present a good opportunity for teaching
about preserving the record. Appellate lawyers for criminal defen-
dants must, therefore, remember the requirements for challenging
convictions on the basis of insufficient proof. It is important for crim-
inal law professors to explain that appealing a criminal case is not
simply a matter of filing a notice of appeal from a judgment. To chal-
63. White, 352 Ark. 183, 99 S.W.3d 409 (2003); ARK. R. EVID. 103(a)(1).
64. ARK. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); see Tauber v. State, 324 Ark. 47, 50, 919 S.W.2d 196,
197 (1996).
65. See Tauber, 324 Ark. at 49-50,919 S.W.2d at 197-98.
66. 324 Ark. 47, 919 S.W.2d 196 (1996).
67. Id. at 49-50, 919 S.W.2d at 197-98.
68. See Watson v. State, 329 Ark. 511, 512, 951 S.W.2d 304, 305 (1997).
69. 324 Ark. 47, 919 S.W.2d 196 (1996).
70. 329 Ark. 511,951 S.W.2d 304 (1997).
71. Id. at 512, 951 S.W.2d at 305.
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lenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence on appeal, the defendant
in a jury trial must have moved for a directed verdict, first at the close
of the State's case, and again at the close of all evidence. Further-
more, in his motions, the defendant must have specified what aspects
of the State's evidence were deficient]3 In Newman v. State,4 the court
affirmed a capital-murder conviction because Newman's motion for a
directed verdict merely stated that the "testimony did not 'reflect' all
of the elements of capital murder. 75 Similarly, in Eastin v. State,76 the
court affirmed drug convictions when the defendant's directed-verdict
motion stated only that the State lacked sufficient proof for a prima
facie case.7 This is not enough. The point of this requirement, which
appellate courts strictly construe, is to allow the State to reopen its
case and present the missing proof.
78
Litigants deserve fair trials, and they hope for a fair appeal if they
challenge a lower court's ruling. Making students aware of common
appellate arguments while reminding them of the preservation rule
will focus their minds on the important relationship between the two
stages of the case-lower court and appellate court. Remembering
that relationship is crucial; lawyers who fail to do so may do their
clients a disservice by foreclosing a reversal on waived points. If, how-
ever, the appellate points are preserved, the appellants have overcome
the first hurdle to a reversal on the merits. The next step is to consider
the appellate court's standard of review.
C. Have I Framed My Argument in Terms of the Applicable Stan-
dard of Review?
1. Understanding the Standard of Review
One of the most overlooked, but important, aspects of appellate
practice involves the standard of review. Most lawyers know that in
criminal cases, the state must prove each element of the charged of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt. And most of them know that a civil
plaintiff has a lower burden of proof. However, those standards apply
72. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(a).
73. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.1(c); see Newman v. State, 353 Ark. 258, 281, 106 S.W.3d
438, 453 (2006).
74. 353 Ark. 258, 106 S.W.3d 438 (2006).
75. Id. at 281, 106 S.W.3d at 453.
76. 370 Ark. 10, 257 S.W.3d 58 (2007).




to lower court proceedings, not appeals. Lawyers sometimes fail to
realize that appellate courts rule not only on the merits of a case but
also on the lower court's rulings about those merits. Appellate judges
are not necessarily smarter, more experienced, or better decision-
makers than trial judges. Appellate judges do not simply re-decide the
case on appeal. Instead, an appellate court's job is remedial-it cor-
rects preserved and reversible errors that occurred in the lower court.
Thus, lawyers should know how much deference an appellate court
will give to a lower court's decision if it is appealed. This degree of
deference-the standard of review-is often dispositive in appeals,
and thus, it warrants a lawyer's careful attention.
In some cases, appellate courts give considerable deference to the
lower court. When the issue is a matter of fact, for example, the trial
court or the jury is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and
witnesses. Thus, the appellate court will give great weight to those
fact-finder's decisions.79 In other cases, however, appellate courts scru-
tinize the lower court's decision much more closely. When the issue on
appeal is solely a matter of law, the appellate court will give little or
no deference to the lower court, which is in no better position than an
appellate court to make decisions about the law.' If brief-writers can
determine which standard of review applies to their case, then they
can better tailor their briefs to fit the evaluative level of the appellate
court. If, however, appellants proceed under the wrong standard of
review, then they may present facts and arguments in a way that, even
if persuasive to the court, will not win a reversal.
Determining which standard applies is important because appel-
lants must succinctly state in their brief the standard of review for each
issue in their appeal.' Sometimes the applicable standard of review is
obvious; in other cases, it is less clear. And, sometimes, the issue on
appeal is a complex question for which it is possible to argue two stan-
dards of review. Furthermore, there are special standards for review-
ing the decisions of certain state agencies and for special types of or-
ders. In general, however, four main standards-de novo, clearly er-
roneous, abuse of discretion, and substantial evidence-predominate
in Arkansas law.
79. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep't of Human Services, 344 Ark. 207, 213, 40 S.W.3d 286,
291 (2001) (reversing and remanding trial court's termination of parental rights).
80. Guerrero v. OK Foods, Inc., 94 Ark. App. 333, 335, 230 S.W.3d 296, 297
(2006) (holding that the intentional-tort exception to exclusive-remedy workers com-
pensation doctrine did not apply to certain employers).
81. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(7).
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Questions of law--constitutional or statutory interpretation is-
sues, for example-are reviewed by the appellate court de novo.8 A
de novo review allows the appellate court to look at the entire record
and essentially re-decide the case.83 It is the least deferential standard
of review because the appellate court is not required to give any
weight to the lower court's judgment.' The clearly-erroneous standard
is much more deferential. In cases where an appellate court looks for
clear error-such as appeals of a circuit court's factual findings-it will
not reverse the lower court's judgment unless it has a firm and definite
belief that the lower court made a mistake.' The abuse-of-discretion
standard of review is similarly deferential-to reverse a case because
the lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court must find
that the lower court acted "improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without
due consideration"' or made an error of law.' The substantial-
evidence standard is also common in appeals-it is often seen in ap-
peals of criminal convictions. Under that standard, appellate courts
determine whether the lower court's judgment is supported by evi-
dence of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way
or the other with reasonable certainty, without speculation or conjec-
ture.
Interestingly, in Arkansas courts, the de novo standard is some-
times used in combination with the other standards. The formulation
might look something like: We review termination-of-parental-rights
cases de novo, and reverse only if the lower court clearly erred . In
these circumstances, the "de novo" seems to define the scope of the
review, rather than the standard of review. It means that the court will
review the entire record, rather than just the parts of the record that
support the lower court's judgment.' Clear error, however, seems to
82. Guerrero, 94 Ark. App. at 335,230 S.W.3d at 297.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. ARK. R. Civ. P. 52; see, Dinkins v. Ark. Dep't of Human Services, 344 Ark.
207, 213, 40 S.W.3d 286,291 (2001).
86. Grant v. State, 357 Ark. 91, 93, 161 S.W.3d 785, 786 (2004) (affirming murder
and battery conviction over hearsay objection to dying-declaration testimony).
87. See, Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 320 Ark. 15, 20-21, 894 S.W.2d 897, 900
(1995). (reversing and remanding a grant of a new trial in a products-liability case
because the order was based on a legal error about evidence).
88. Hudson v. State, 53 Ark. App. 111, 112, 919 S.W.2d 518, 519 (1996) (affirming
drug-delivery conviction).
89. Dinkins, 344 Ark. at 213,40 S.W.3d at 291.




be the standard of review. The court will only reverse the lower judg-
ment if it is firmly convinced of a mistake.91 In addition to these four
general standards, appellate judges apply special standards to certain
kinds of final orders. An order granting summary judgment, for exam-
ple, is reviewed to see whether the evidence presented by the moving
party left any question of material fact unanswered.9 The appellate
court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party and will resolve all doubts and inferences against the
moving party. 93
Appeals that come from state administrative agencies may also be
subject to special standards of review. For example, an appellate court
must affirm a workers' compensation commission decision if "reason-
able minds could reach the Commission's conclusion."'94 It does not
matter whether the appellate court would have decided the case diffe-
rently had the case been before it in the first instance. Unless the court
determines that the commission's ruling was unreasonable, then the
court must affirm.95 Workers' compensation appellants, therefore,
cannot just re-present their evidence to the appellate court. Instead,
under this highly deferential standard, an appellate brief must focus
on the unreasonableness of the commission's decision.96 The appel-
lant's goal is to persuade the appellate judges that no reasonable per-
son could have interpreted the evidence in the way that the commis-
sion did.97
2. Suggestions for Substantive Courses Regarding Standards of
Review
Professors teaching substantive law school classes have many op-
portunities to point out the relevant standards of review to their stu-
91. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep't of Human Services, 344 Ark. 207, 213, 40 S.W.3d 286,
291 (2001).
92. Rice v. Tanner, 363 Ark. 79, 82, 210 S.W.3d 860, 863 (2005) (affirming sum-
mary judgment in malpractice case because none of the decedent's heirs-at-law were
joined as parties before the statute of limitations ran).
93. Id.
94. Lloyd v. United Parcel Service, 69 Ark. App. 92, 94, 9 S.W.3d 564, 565 (2000)
(reversing and remanding a Workers' Compensation Commission order that an em-
ployee is entitled to benefits for carpal tunnel syndrome).
95. Id.
96. See Barnes v. Greenhead Farming, 101 Ark. App. 129, 130, 270 S.W.3d 873,
874 (2008).
97. The standard is the same in employment benefits cases. Tate v. Director of
Dep't of Worforce Services, 100 Ark. App. 394, 269 S.W.3d 402 (2007).
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dents. A simple explanation-even a mere mention--of the applicable
standards will remind law school students about the appellate court's
lens, and make it easier for them to draft a persuasive brief. Depend-
ing on the type of class, law professors can be more or less explicit
about the standard of review that applies.
In workers' compensation or employment law classes, for exam-
ple, professors would be well-advised to teach the standard of review
specifically because it will be the same in almost every appeal from the
workers' compensation commission. Thus, students in those classes
should learn, and professors should teach, that the appellant's goal is
to persuade the appellate judges that no reasonable person could have
interpreted the evidence in the way the commission did.
Family law classes also present a good opportunity for teaching
the standards of review commonly applied to domestic cases. These
appeals sometimes evoke great sympathy from judges who may feel
strongly about issues related to divorce and child custody. No matter
how emotionally persuasive an appellant's brief is, however, appellate
judges must affirm some decisions unless they are left with "a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."98 Appellate courts
give greater deference to the lower courts in child-custody cases be-
cause it is there that the lower court had the opportunity to use all its
powers of perception to the fullest extent to evaluate witnesses, their
testimony, and the child's best interest.' Lawyers, therefore, must
grasp the importance of not just convincing the appellate judges not
just that the lower court's decision is incorrect, but also firmly convinc-
ing them that no reasonable lower court judge could have applied the
law to the facts in that way.'O°
Criminal law classes provide a good opportunity for professors to
teach about the substantial evidence standard that is used to review
criminal convictions challenged solely on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. In those cases, the appellate court must affirm the lower court's
decision if the conviction is supported by evidence of sufficient force
and character to compel reasonable minds to reach that conclusion
and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. 1' When reviewing the con-
viction, the appellate court looks at the evidence in the light most fa-
98. Dinkins, 344 Ark. at 213, 40 S.W.3d at 291.
99. Word v. Remick, 75 Ark. App. 390, 394, 58 S.W.3d 422,424-25 (2001) (affirm-
ing child-custody modification).
100. E.g., Prows v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 101 Ark. App. 205,
- S.W.3d __ (2008); Downum v. Downum, 101 Ark. App. 243, S.W.3d __
(2008).
101. King v. State, 100 Ark. App. 208,209, 266 S.W.3d 205,208 (2007).
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vorable to the State'---it does not even consider evidence that weighs
against the defendant's guilt. The fact that there is some reasonable
doubt about the conviction will not win a reversal because the State,
as the appellee, does not have to re-prove the defendant's guilt. The
State need only show that there is substantial evidence of that guilt. °3
Criminal appellants have a steep hill to climb, and professors should
teach their students that simply revealing the weaknesses of the State's
proof will not automatically win a reversal. Instead, the appellant's
lawyer in these cases has the heavy burden of showing that there was
little or no evidence to support the conviction."
Criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence classes are good
places to teach the standard of review for evidentiary rulings. If, for
example, a criminal appeal depends on an evidentiary ruling, then the
appellant must tailor its argument for that issue to a different standard
of review. Decisions about evidence are left to the trial court's discre-
tion, and appellate courts will not reverse that decision unless it
represents an abuse of discretion." Though unusual, reversals for an
abuse of discretion do occur if the appellate lawyer can compose a
brief that convinces the appellate court that the lower court's decision
is groundless or contains an error of law."
In multi-issue appeals, each issue potentially has a different appli-
cable standard of review. Thus, each case may present a thicket of is-
sues and related standards through which appellate lawyers must ma-
neuver as they frame their arguments. The point here is not to provide
an exhaustive list of all the standards of review in Arkansas or explain
in-depth any one of them-other resources are available for that."°
The point is that these standards exist and that they are too important
to ignore when writing an appellate brief. Understanding the relevant
standards of review will help students remember the appellate court's
lens and make it easier for them to draft a persuasive, careful brief




105. Phavixay v. State, 373 Ark. 168, _ S.W.3d __ (2008), reh'g denied Phavixay
v. State, No. CR07-585, 2008 WL 2206206 (Ark. May 29, 2008); Lee v. State, 102 Ark.
App. 23, __ S.W.3d - (2008).
106. Phavixay, 373 Ark. 168, __ S.W.3d
107. See ARKANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION, HANDLING APPEALS IN ARKANSAS (2007).
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D. Have I Followed the Appellate Rules and Composed a Good,
Careful Brief?
1. Understanding the Importance of Care
Appellate briefs must be careful-that is, they must be full of
care. Lawyers labor under extreme time pressure-filing deadlines
and hearing dates always seem to be looming. Appellate judges,
clerks, and other court employees, however, are as time-limited as
attorneys, and their patience is often worn thin by reading careless
briefs and petitions. When faced with the prospect of wading through
a brief that is disrespectful, full of typos, inaccurate, nonconforming,
or messy, the reader may look to the other party's brief for a clearer
presentation of the case. Moreover, they might be tempted to regard
the sloppiness of the brief as an indication of the credibility and cali-
ber of the argument within it. Thus, a lawyer's sacrifice of care to get
an appellate brief timely filed pays no real reward. Additionally, ap-
pellants, who usually begin the appeal as the underdog because of the
standard of review, put themselves at an even greater disadvantage by
filing careless briefs. There are, however, some lessons that students
can learn to help them prepare appellate briefs that will be truly ap-
pealing.
First, appellants must know and adhere to court rules about the
content, composition, and filing of appellate briefs. When certain
court rules or orders particularly apply to a subject matter, lawyers
must be aware of them. The Arkansas Rules of Civil and Criminal
Procedure are obviously relevant and important. Equally important,
however, are the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-Civil and
Criminal, the Supreme Court Rules, and the administrative orders
that affect appellate briefs. Lawyers dealing with evidentiary issues
should look not only to the Federal Rules of Evidence, but also the
Arkansas Rules of Evidence.
Disregarding the requirements of those rules can be fatal to an
appellate argument, and a flagrant disregard could even lead to sanc-
tions.08 For example, in Baker v. Baker,"°9 the court of appeals dis-
missed an appeal because the appellant did not follow Arkansas Rule
of Appellate Procedure-Civil 6(b).11 The appellee in that case had
108. King v. State, 312 Ark. 89, 91, 847 S.W.2d 37, 38-39 (1993) (cautioning appel-
lant for flagrantly deficient abstract).
109. 43 Ark. App. 56, 858 S.W.2d 157 (1993).
110. Id. at 57, 858 S.W.2d at 157-58 (dismissing appeal where the appellant failed
to order additional parts of the record designated by the appellee pursuant to ARK. R.
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designated additional parts of the record to be brought up on appeal."'
When the appellant failed to order those additional parts, the appel-
late court dismissed."' In Lackey v. Mays,"3 the court of appeals or-
dered a re-briefing where the appellant made numerous errors in the
abstract and addendum and was improperly argumentative in parts of
the brief, such as the informational statement, that needed to be ob-
jective."4
Besides the technical requirements for briefs, appellants must pay
attention to the completeness of their arguments. Generally, an appel-
late court is only bound to review matters that are briefed and argued
by the appellant."5 Some appellants lose because they fail to address
all of the grounds of the lower court's decision. When the trial court
expressly bases its decision on multiple independent grounds and the
appellant challenges only one of those grounds, the appellate court
may affirm the lower court's decision without addressing any of the
appellant's grounds for appeal.1
6 That was the case in Pugh v. State,1
7
in which the court refused to reverse an evidentiary ruling on relevan-
cy grounds because the circuit court excluded the evidence on hearsay
grounds as well."8 Additionally, litigants may lose their appeals be-
cause they fail to show the prejudice resulting from the error they al-
lege. 9 Unless the appellant can show the appellate court how it was
damaged by the lower court's ruling, the court will have no reason to
remedy the alleged error.'20
Another appellate-practice error is the disrespectful tone taken
by some brief writers. An inappropriate tone usually results from ig-
norance about the appellate court's limited role. Appellants must be
sensitive to this role, keeping in mind the court's hesitancy to overstep
its constitutional and institutional boundaries. Appellate judges, for
APP. P. - CIV. 6(b)); Calaway v. Dickson, 360 Ark. 463, 201 S.W.3d 931 (2005) (or-
dering rebriefing for failure to abstract a hearing in accordance with ARK. SUP. Cr. R.
4-2).
111. Baker, at 56-57, 858 S.W.2d at 157.
112. Id. at 57, 858 S.W.2d at 157.
113. 100 Ark. App. 386, 269 S.W.3d 397 (2007).
114. Id. at 386, 269 S.W.3d at 398.
115. Ark. R. App. P. - Crim. 14.
116. See Pugh v. State, 351 Ark. 5, 11, 89 S.W.3d 909, 912 (2002).
117. 351 Ark. 5, 89 S.W.3d 909 (2002).
118. Id. at 11, 89 S.W.3d at 912.
119. Webb v. Thomas, 310 Ark. 553, 559, 837 S.W.2d 875, 878 (1992) (declining to
address the trial court's refusal to admit video-taped transcript when the appellant's




example, are almost always cautious in overruling precedent.12' In
Chamberlin v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance, the supreme court
explained the court's hesitancy to overrule precedent, saying:
The policy of stare decisis is designed to lend predictability and sta-
bility to the law. It is well-settled that "[p]recedent governs until it
gives a result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break
becomes unavoidable." Our test is whether adherence to the rule
would result in "great injury or injustice."' '
Particular judges may feel bound by personal or institutional
loyalty to past decisions or the judges who decided those cases. Brief-
writers must recognize that reality, as well as the "colleague factor,"
and remember that judges are being reviewed by their peers as well as
the parties. Appellants should also note that the court of appeals is
bound to follow United States and Arkansas Supreme Court
precedent." Thus if an appellant wants a supreme court case over-
turned, only that court-not the court of appeals-may do so.
Furthermore, judges are often hesitant to "make law" and thus be
labeled judicial activists. Often they will be more inclined to alert the
general assembly to a statutory problem rather than interpret an exist-
ing law to mean something that, by its terms, it does not.'25 A good
example of this reluctance is found in Sowders v. St. Joseph's Mercy
Health Center,'26 where the court rejected the contention that charita-
ble immunity violated the Arkansas Constitution, and for the second
time called on the General Assembly to consider whether charitable
immunity should be abolished. 27 Appellants should respect the demo-
cratic aspects of the judicial system and not ask an appellate court to
''rewrite" statutes.
Finally, it goes without saying that appellate briefs should be free
of typographical errors, misstatements, and inaccuracies (especially in
citations to authority and pertinent facts). Punctiliousness is not re-
121. See Chamberlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 343 Ark. 392, 397-98, 36
S.W.3d 281, 284 (2001) (citations omitted).
122. 343 Ark. 392, 36 S.W.3d 281 (2001).
123. Id. at 397-98, 36 S.W.3d at 284.
124. Brewer v. State, 68 Ark. App. 216, 221, 6 S.W.3d 124, 127 (1999) (declining to
adopt the Arizona requirement for medical expert testimony about the defendant's
emotional propensity to act in a pedophile case).
125. Sowders v. St. Joseph's Mercy Health Center, 368 Ark. 466, 477, 247 S.W.3d
514, 522 (2007); Guerrero v. OK Foods Inc., 94 Ark. App. at 333, 336, 230 S.W.3d 296,
298 (2006).
126. 368 Ark. 466, 247 S.W.3d 514 (2007).
127. Id. at 477,247 S.W.3d at 522.
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quired, but is admired, as is neatness and an agreeable aesthetic ap-
pearance.
2. Suggestions for Substantive Courses Regarding Composition
Professors have opportunities to teach about the importance of
carefulness in every law school class. Remember: law school is a pro-
fessional school. Students should learn to regard their course work as
the first work product of their legal careers. Professors should stress
the importance of a professional appearance in course work and on
exams-correct spelling, grammar, and citations. When certain court
rules or orders particularly apply to a subject matter, professors could
simply make students aware of them. For example, evidence profes-
sors should direct students not only to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
but also the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. In Civil Procedure classes,
students should be aware of the applicable Rules of the Arkansas Su-
preme Court and Court of Appeals as well as the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. And, to foster effective brief-writing, professors might point
out to students how judicial opinions often reflect the appellate briefs.
Criminal law students, for example, might benefit from considering
how the court's depiction of the defendant in its final opinion reflected
the defendant's presentation in the briefs. These suggestions may
seem too burdensome or time-consuming for law professors and stu-
dents alike. But the fact that so many lawyers have disregarded care,
precision, and accuracy in their briefs indicates a need for greater em-
phasis on these practices when possible in law school.
III. CONCLUSION
Teaching more appellate practice in substantive law-school
classes is a practical solution to a serious problem. Law school profes-
sors and students of the law-those in law school and those who con-
tinue to study as academics and practitioners-have the duty and pri-
vilege of improving the body of law with their attention to appellate
practice. Moreover, following the rules and paying attention to details
are parts of an attorney's ethical obligation to competence.' 29 Lawyers
are integral parts of the court system. They are the allies of the courts
"in promoting fair and efficient appellate justices, as guardians of the
integrity of the appellate process,... and as members of a primarily
128. Coleen M. Barger, How to Write a Losing Brief, 30 THE ARKANSAS LAWYER
10 (Spring 1996); Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 BYU L. REv. 325 (1992).
129. ARK. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCr 1.1.
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self-regulated profession capable of advancing and adopting reforms
that improve the administration of justice.""13 As the late Judge Ri-
chard S. Arnold said, our courts should be "places where anybody can
come in and say, 'I am a human being. I am here.... I have law.... So
judge my case. .. .""' Good appellate practice helps make our courts
these places by allowing appellate judges to decide a case on its merits,
rather than its procedural flaws.
130. JAPP supra note 1, at 2.
131. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Old Order Changes, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
77, 81 (2006).
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